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Abstract
Background Increasingly, patient decision aids and values clarifica-
tion methods (VCMs) are being developed to support patients in
making preference-sensitive health-care decisions. Many VCMs
encourage extensive deliberation about options, without solid
theoretical or empirical evidence showing that deliberation is
advantageous. Research suggests that simple, fast and frugal
heuristic decision strategies sometimes result in better judgments
and decisions. Durand et al. have developed two fast and frugal
heuristic-based VCMs.
Objective To critically analyse the suitability of the take the best
(TTB) and tallying fast and frugal heuristics in the context of
patient decision making.
Strategy Analysis of the structural similarities between the envi-
ronments in which the TTB and tallying heuristics have been proven
successful and the context of patient decision making and of the
potential of these heuristic decision processes to support patient
decision making.
Conclusion The specific nature of patient preference-sensitive
decision making does not seem to resemble environments in
which the TTB and tallying heuristics have proven successful.
Encouraging patients to consider less rather than more relevant
information potentially even deteriorates their values clarification
process. Values clarification methods promoting the use of more
intuitive decision strategies may sometimes be more effective.
Nevertheless, we strongly recommend further theoretical thinking
about the expected value of such heuristics and of other more
intuitive decision strategies in this context, as well as empirical
assessments of the mechanisms by which inducing such decision
strategies may impact the quality and outcome of values
clarification.
doi: 10.1111/j.1369-7625.2011.00720.x
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Introduction
Strategies of care sometimes are equivalent from
a standpoint of medical efficacy. Such so-called
preference-sensitive screening or treatment
decisions often are new to patients, entail com-
plicated trade-offs (e.g. risk of a miscarriage vs.
risk of giving birth to a disabled child in prenatal
diagnosis), evoke strong emotions and may have
significant, sometimes irreversible conse-
quences.1–5 When facing such decisions, patient
preferences can be labile or non-existent6–8 and
need to be clarified. As available alternatives
often cannot directly be compared on single
quantifiable attributes (i.e. there is no common
currency),3,4 making treatment and screening
decisions is challenging.
Increasingly, patient decision aids (PtDAs) are
being developed to support patient decision
making. Patient decision aids can enhance
patients knowledge and their satisfaction with
the decision-making process.9 However, their
effect on decision quality and decision process
measures, such as feeling clear about ones values,
varies.10 As Durand et al. and others have
underlined, we lack insight into the nature of
cognitive processes that might help patients make
informed preference-sensitive decisions.11–15 We
underscore their and others call for stronger
theoretical and conceptual underpinnings for
designing PtDAs12,16,17,18 Empirical tests of the-
oretically-based PtDAs will improve our under-
standing of how to design effective PtDAs.
Mechanisms underlying current values
clarification methods
So-called values clarification methods (VCMs)
currently included in PtDAs largely encourage
extensive deliberation: analytical, explicit
reasoning processes, such as listing pros and
cons and assigning decision weights (e.g. 1–5
stars) to them.19 This reflects a central assump-
tion in the literature that VCMs should
encourage extensive deliberation.20,21 However,
human reasoning strongly depends on intui-
tion.22–25 Over the past 20 years, psychological
evidence has accumulated, showing that intui-
tive decision strategies such as relying on emo-
tional gut feelings, deciding after a brief period
of distraction, or deciding based on mental
shortcuts or heuristics sometimes result in better
judgments and decisions (i.e. more in line with
expert opinion, more accurate, or resulting in
higher consumer satisfaction) than extensively
considering all information.26–28 It is as yet
unclear to what extent these findings can be
translated to patient decision making. Durand
et al. provide a first test of the feasibility of
VCMs based on fast and frugal heuristics.
Thereby, they make an important contribution
to the field of PtDAs. First, they designed the-
oretically-informed VCMs.12,16 Second, these
VCMs are based on more intuitive decision
strategies. Their study provides preliminary
insight into how decision makers value such
tools.11 However, we see important pitfalls in
translating fast and frugal heuristics to the
context of PtDAs. Here, we aim to provide a
critical analysis of the suitability of these sim-
plifying heuristics in VCMs.
Fast and frugal heuristics
Fast and frugal heuristics are decision strategies
that (i) are simple: they exploit evolved or
learned human capacities; (ii) are ecologically
rational: they are not inherently good or bad,
but they are accurate relative to the structure of
the environment; and (iii) describe the way
people make decisions naturally in those envi-
ronments.26,28,29
Research has shown that using fast and frugal
heuristics, and thereby less information and
time, sometimes results in more accurate judg-
ments (i.e. more in line with actual facts).28 Two
such heuristics are take the best (TTB) and
tallying. The TTB heuristic is member of the
one good reason family of heuristics. It implies
ignoring cues and making inferences based on
the first cue encountered which enables one to
make the inference. Tallying is a strategy in
which information elements are given equal
weight in making predictions. Both types of
heuristics have been found to be equally or more
accurate in making judgments compared to
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more complex decision strategies in various set-
tings, including estimating which of two cities
has a larger population, the number of car
accidents on specific stretches of highways, and
attractiveness ratings of public figures.30,31
The suitability of fast and frugal heuristics
in patient decision aids
Durand et al.11 have designed a TTB and a tal-
lying heuristic-based VCM for women facing the
decision to undergo or not to undergo amnio-
centesis. We question the suitability of these
heuristics in patient preference-sensitive decision
making for two main reasons: (i) the qualitative
difference between making inferences in familiar
decisions vs. determining preference in new
decisions by integrating information and (ii)
decision environments in which information and
time resources are limited vs. decision environ-
ments in which these are not at stake.
(i) Making inferences vs. determining prefer-
ence. In the medical field, the use of simple heu-
ristics rather thanmore complete information has
been shown to be equally good or advantageous
to physicians who had to choose a strategy of
care.32–34 In such cases, physicians need to assess
the validity of information for making inferences
about patients condition. Also, an external cri-
terion of success exists, which enables decision
makers to determine the accuracy of their esti-
mation. This context is similar to those inmany of
the studies demonstrating the success of fast and
frugal heuristics, which involved decision makers
who were familiar with the decision context and
had experience or gained experience with the
structure of the environment before making a
particular decision.28 Decision makers could
therefore benefit from their experience regarding
the appropriateness of information elements in
making inferences and thus learn to use infor-
mation efficiently. Evidence indeed suggests that
experts tend to apply more selective information
processing than non-experts.35 Durand et al.
suggest that compared to more complex inter-
ventions, fast and frugal heuristics may, in a
similar way, lead to better decisions in patients as
decision makers.
However, patients do not make objectively
accurate or inaccurate inferences about some
external object; they need to integrate and weigh
pieces of information to determine their personal
preference in new decision situations. Prefer-
ence-sensitive options in health care carry ben-
efits and risks. The central task in clarifying
ones preference lies in making trade-offs
between these. Patients need to consider to what
extent pieces of information are important to
them in their specific situation. They lack the
experience with the decision that would have
enabled them to know how well relying on spe-
cific pieces of information helps them to make a
decision they will not regret later on. Also, there
is no external criterion for the accuracy of
preferences, because good patient decisions in
health care may lead to bad outcomes. For
example, amniocentesis may result in a miscar-
riage, but was it then a bad decision? In other
words, outcome of a specific decision does not
teach decision makers about the rightness of
their choice, as it would have if there was an
external accuracy standard involved.
(ii) Limited information and time resources. In
arguing in favour of the suitability of the TTB
and tallying heuristics, Durand et al. refer to
decision situations in which there is limited
knowledge and time and in which these have
proven successful.36–40 The success of judgments
based on less information is attributed to the
bias-variance dilemma. By using less informa-
tion, the variance component in errors of pre-
dictions is reduced. However, when information
acquisition costs are low, when there is no time
pressure and when information is provided
simultaneously, compensatory strategies, that is,
strategies in which favourable values on some
attribute can compensate for unfavourable val-
ues on other attributes, predict individuals
inferences41,42 and preferences41 better.
Generally, in decisions for which PtDAs are
available, information search and potential costs
associated with searching are not at stake, as the
PtDA offers the relevant information. By defini-
tion, decision aids should provide all relevant
information about the condition and options. So,
patients who have access to PtDAs have access to
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information, which they can use to evaluate how
much they prefer one option over the other.
Also, in cases in which PtDAs are offered,
there is often sufficient time available to consider
ones preference regarding the options. In case of
deciding about amniocentesis, women usually
have 2–3 weeks to decide whether or not they
wish to conduct the test – or even more, if we
take into account that women may start con-
sidering amniocentesis from the moment they
know they are pregnant. It is therefore ques-
tionable whether the level of time pressure is
comparable to the level of time pressure which
was present in the studies showing an advantage
of fast and frugal strategies.
Should fast and frugal heuristics be
encouraged as decision processes?
We argued above that we have reason to expect
that the structure of the patient decision-making
context differs from the structure of environ-
ments in which the TTB and tallying heuristics
have been shown to result in accurate judgments.
We further expect that heuristic decision strate-
gies are not accurate descriptions of patients
natural decision processes. Specifically, we
expect that patients will rather use compensatory
decision strategies because of patients lack of
expertise with the decision,35 their personal
involvement,43 the relatively small number of
options (e.g. undergoing or not undergoing
amniocentesis) and attributes that distinguish
the options (e.g. risk of miscarriage, gain in
certainty about chromosomal problems),44–46
and because the decision is made under uncer-
tainty.47 Yet, an appealing aspect of heuristic-
based VCMs is their apparent simplicity in use.
It is an empirical question whether TTB and ⁄or
tallying heuristic-based VCMs may be helpful in
supporting patients in clarifying their values.
Empirical evidence suggests that active process-
ing of information, and of probabilistic infor-
mation in particular, is useful in understanding
information.48 Therefore, heuristic tools may be
helpful because they help patients to actively
engage with the information, that is, to think
about reasons to choose or not to choose an
option. This may support patients in determining
the importance of information to their prefer-
ence. An important issue here is the assumption
that patient preferences will often at least partly
be constructed when patients face a preference-
sensitive decision. There is evidence showing that
people apply either compensatory or non-com-
pensatory decision strategies depending on the
preference elicitation method49,50 and that
strategy use affects outcomes.50,51 If patients are
encouraged to consider less rather than more
relevant information, it is questionable whether
this will improve the values clarification process.
It may even deteriorate that process by drawing
attention to a single attribute that may be easiest
to evaluate, but may not necessarily be the most
important in determining preference.27
Of note, Durand et al. characterize their tools
as intuitive. Intuition serves as a broad umbrella
term for highly diverse decision strategies, which
share the feature of not being analytical. Some of
these may be more suitable for VCMs than oth-
ers. Heuristic-based tools as Durand et al.
describe may be less complex in use than more
conventional VCMs but still rely on considering
attributes of options. They do not encourage
holistic evaluations of options, such as relying on
emotional gut feelings or deciding after a brief
period of distraction. Such intuitive preferences
have been argued to be based on more compre-
hensive processes and to represent balanced,
intuitive summary judgments of well-inte-
grated information elements.3,4,23,24,26,52 Future
research could provide tests of the suitability of
specific intuitive processes in VCMs.15
Conclusion
Many VCMs encourage individuals who are
considering preference-sensitive health-care
options to deliberate extensively, without a solid
theoretical and empirical basis for the assumption
that deliberation is advantageous. The TTB and
tallying heuristics are examples of more intuitive
decision strategies that have been proven advan-
tageous in decision tasks other than patient
preference-sensitive decisionmaking. The specific
nature of patient values clarification does not
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seem to resemble environments in which these
heuristics have proven to do well. Moreover,
encouraging patients to consider less rather than
more relevant information potentially deterio-
rates their decision processes. Values clarification
methods supporting patients to usemore intuitive
decision strategies may sometimes be more effec-
tive, but the evidence is still very limited. We
strongly recommend further theoretical thinking
about the expected value of fast and frugal heu-
ristics and other intuitive decision strategies in
this context aswell as empirical assessments of the
mechanisms by which inducing such decision
strategies may impact the quality and outcome of
values clarification.
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